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Abstract
In an environment where technical solutions for securing networked systems are commonplace, there still exist
problems in implementation of such solutions for home and small business users. One component of this
protection is the use of intrusion detection systems. Intrusion detection monitors network traffic for suspicious
activity, performs access blocking and alerts the system administrator or user of potential attacks. This paper
reviews the basic function of intrusion detection systems and maps them to an existing end-user capability
framework. Using this framework, implementation guidance and systematic improvement in implementation of
this security measure are defined.
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INTRODUCTION
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is an alarm system for a computer or network. The concept of IDS was first
introduced by Anderson in 1980. Anderson identified the reasons for intrusions as: to access information, alter
information or render a system unusable. Therefore, intrusion detection is a security measure which monitors
network traffic and alerts the system if there is any suspicious activity occurring in the network. Thus, its role in
security is to detect, log and raise alarms when intrusion events are detected. Intrusion events can be computer
attacks or unauthorised access attempts. IDS is similar to burglar alarm in a vehicle. The vehicle is protected by
a lock system and if this lock is broken, it will alert the user by raising an alarm which indicates that someone is
trying to steal the car. Intrusion detection systems are often compared with firewall security. A firewall protects
an organization from malicious attacks outside the network and an intrusion detection system alerts the
administrator if someone passes through the firewall and accesses the network (Innela & Mcmillan, 2001).
An IDS monitors for unusual activity and events based on the set-up policy defined by the organisation. It can
perform certain actions to avoid unauthorized entry by blocking the user or source IP address from accessing the
network (Sundaram, 1996). Many IDS systems are proprietary, making the setup and configuration of them
complex and therefore difficult to an end-user to install and maintain correctly (Whitman, Mattford, &
Shackleford, 2006). In this paper, the necessity for such a system is presented together with an overview of the
types of IDS available. Subsequently, the key processes involved in IDS configuration and use are discussed.
Since IDS is a defensive security measure that is complex to configure and maintain from an end-user
perspective, a mapping of these processes to the Security Capability Operational Framework developed by
Williams (2008) is proposed.

THE NEED FOR INTRUSION DETECTION
As the complexity of networks increase and access to the unregulated Internet environment, so does the intricacy
of network attacks. Thus preventing adverse events becomes increasingly difficult. However, mitigation and
deterrence of malicious hacking and unauthorised intrusions can be put into effect by the use of an IDS
(Rosenthal, 2002). As such, an IDS is a constituent part of a total security solution and not a total solution in
itself. However, it is essential for protecting an organization from unauthorized users and should be a part of
every comprehensive security solution because it detects vulnerabilities in the network and alerts the
administrator to the possibility of an attack. When an attack pattern is detected and the administrator advised, it
is vital to include new rules for the IDS and distribute them (Lear, 2000). Consequently, extensible IDS can help
to install these new rules quicker to all machines without having to reinstall the rules onto each system. Furether,
there is a need for proper use and maintenance of IDS to ensure they do not negatively impact security over time
(Adams, 1996). When an IDS detects a potentially adverse event it sends out alerts and logs activity. However,

whilst an IDS allows for supervision of a network, it still requires appropriate implementation and maintenance.
IDS technology cannot be effective and operate at an optimum level if implemented haphazardly. To date this
implementation by end-users has been undertaken poorly (Northcutt & Novak, 2002; Rosenthal, 2002). To
understand why this is an issue, it is first necessary to appreciate how an IDS functions.

IDS TECHNOLOGY
IDS consist of two components namely a management console and sensors. The management console is the
reporting console for when an attack occurs, and the sensors are agents that detect and monitor the hosts in a
network (SANS, 2008). In essence, IDS works by maintaining a database of attack signatures which have been
obtained from previous malicious activity. These attack signatures are matched with the potentially malicious
packets that are detected.

IDS Types
There are two types of intrusion detection system namely, host based intrusion detection and network based
intrusion detection system (Innela & Mcmillan, 2001).

Host-based intrusion detection system
Host-based intrusion detection works by collecting information from individual computers by detecting and
monitoring the activities of an attack on an operating system by collecting data from the host computer. Hostbased detection only monitors inbound and outbound packets from the system device. They use two sources of
information obtained from operating system audit trails and system logs. Operating system audit trails are
obtained from the kernel of the operating system and system logs give a description about the system activities
on the network.

Network-based intrusion detection system
Network-based of intrusion detection systems work by analysing and capturing the packets in a network. This
type of IDS monitors traffic patterns and alert the system administrator about potential malicious activity (Innela
& Mcmillan, 2001). The sensors used in this type of IDS usually run in ‘stealth mode’, hiding their presence and
avoiding discovery of their presence by attackers. Network intrusion detection system monitors all the inbound
and outbound packets to and from the devices in the network.

Detection Approaches.
Within these types of IDS, two approaches can be adopted for analysing malicious activities to detect attacks.
There are advantages and disadvantages for both the approaches but the most commonly used method is
signature based intrusion system (Bradley, 2008).

Signature Based
Signature-based IDS work by monitoring packets in the network and comparing them with pre-defined attack
signatures in a database. The signature detection records each pattern of events as a separate attack signature.
They are used for detecting attacks whilst minimizing the number of false alarms (Bradley, 2008). Signature
based detection system also help security managers to track security problems in their systems. Therefore,
signature based intrusion detection system detects malware the same way as antivirus software’s detect viruses
and worms.

Anomaly Based
Anomaly-based IDS work by analysing any unusual behaviour of the host in the network. The traffic patterns
for a normal activity are different from the patterns of an attack. The anomaly-based category of IDS monitors
the traffic and compares it with a known baseline. The baseline provides information about vectors such as the
bandwidth, protocols used, ports and devices that connect with each system.
Regardless of the type of IDS employed, standard key processes can be identified for the standard functions of
IDS.

KEY IDS PROCESSES
In investigating existing IDS standards, such as NIST and Standards Australia, a number of common key
processes have been identified (Saiglobal, 2004; Scarfone& Mell, 2007). These processes can be included in the
deployment of an efficient intrusion detection system, as shown in the process model in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Process model for efficient intrusion detection systems (Saiglobal, 2004).
The IDS process model (Figure 1) is underpinned by the data sources it has access to. The data sources are
important because this data is used to detect intrusions into the network. These data sources can be obtained
from different levels of the system. Some of the data sources from which intrusions can be found are (Bace &
Mell, 2007):
• Auditing the system resources by checking the audit log file of the operating system which includes
system events and activities. Some of the information such as file access and method of access attempts
may also be useful.
• Recording some of the information such as system parameters, memory use and network connections
are useful for detecting intrusions.
• Network management logs give information about device status and transition.
In order to implement, and more importantly maintain, an effective IDS it is necessary to identify and describe
the key processes involved. Ten key processes are described here.
1.

Activity monitoring and automation. This is the process for monitoring all user and system activities
in a network. The system and network configuration are checked for any intrusions. The main two tasks
of active monitoring are to detect system and network intrusions, and to detect abnormal attack patterns
and user policy violations (White, 2003). The main purpose of activity monitoring is to alert the
administrator of the problems caused by crashed servers, overload, malware infection and failed
connections.

2.

Configuration check. This check is done to identify the system and network configuration. It checks
whether the systems and network have any detectable vulnerabilities. Configuration checking also
looks for hosts that do not belong to the network. All machines in the network should be checked
periodically for malware attack. There are also different types of sniffing tools that can be used in this
configuration checking process.

3.

File authorizations. File authorization checking identifies file, user and group authorizations
modifications. One possible attack vector is to modify the user and group authorization allowing
various attacks on the network. One way of checking the file settings is to place an expected file setting
outside the network and then comparing it with the original file settings.

4.

Log file examination. Log files record actions and events that take place on a network. Log files can
be obtained from various devices such as servers and routers. They are mainly used for checking who
has accessed the network and at what time and from which location.

5.

Packet sniffer check. A packet sniffer, often referred to as a network monitor or analyser, can be used
to detect and troubleshoot network traffic. By analysing the captured packets and identifying the
malicious packets, the administrator can use this information for protecting the network (Bradley,
2008). A packet capture usually captures all the packets passing through the network interface. There
are various ways to undertake this, either by capturing packets to the machine only or capturing all the

packets in promiscuous mode. The issue with promiscuous mode is that any intruder can also capture
and analyse traffic.
6.

Password files check. Password file checking is done periodically to ensure users change passwords
regularly, since unauthorized users try to obtain the passwords and usernames for creating accounts. If
new unauthorised accounts are detected, the accounts should be deleted from the system password file
together with all compromised files. Passwords should be checked and changed frequently by the
system administrator.

7.

Services check. These checks are done to identify any unnecessary services running on the operating
system. Many services may create backdoors for hackers to exploit the vulnerabilities in the system
(Saiglobal, 2004). A service check is done to identify these services and remove the services that are
not needed.

8.

File integrity assessment. The file integrity assessment is important to determine if a file has been
tampered with. Usually such assessments methods can be done manually, however utilising an
automated detection method will increase reliability and therefore effectiveness (Saiglobal, 2004).
Automated IDS is an effective and efficient method of performing statistical analysis and integrity
checking.

9.

Response. Response is the action that a system takes when detecting intrusions on a network. It is most
usefully employed when presenting the event analysis results using a graphical user interface. There are
several methods to alert administrators of events such as via email or pagers (Saiglobal, 2004). A
system administrator can then ascertain the severity of the response and make decisions on the most
appropriate countermeasures. In some IDS, the reaction-response is also able to perform preventive
actions such as locking the account that was attacked and therefore reducing additional potential
damage to the system.

10. Data storage. Data storage is required for storing all detected activities, audit logs and other relevant
information in a database. This database will contain collection of attacks, unusual behaviour patterns
and other attacks that can be used for future detection of intrusions. It can also store the detected
malicious activity for subsequent use as evidence.
These key processes can be used to delineate specific activities for end-user maintenance of their IDS. One
method to make this accessible and understandable to the end-user is to map these processes to a capability
operational framework. One such framework to enable mapping of security activities to end-user capabilities is
the adapted CMM Operation Framework (Williams, 2008).

CAPABILITY MATURITY MODEL (CMM) OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
A capability maturity model (CMM) is a methodology founded in 1986 by Software Engineering Institute (SEI)
at Carnegie Mellon University to develop organizational software development processes. The main purpose of
this model is to guide and help organizations to develop and maintain their key process areas. This model has
been modified and developed by many companies to improve their capability in key management areas. One of
the important factors to be considered for CMM is using the knowledge of the maturity levels and identifying
the differences between mature and immature organizational processes.
CMM provides five distinct levels for measuring the maturity of the development of processes. These maturity
levels help in providing a well-defined, proper path for achieving improved processes. In this case we are
looking at improving the implementation and maintenance processes of intrusion detection systems. The
different levels are defined in Table 1.
Table 1. The capability operational framework, maturity levels description (Carnegie Mellon University, 2003).
Level
1
2
3
4
5

Heading
Initial
Repeatable
Defined
Managed
Optimized

Description
Procedures are performed in an ad hoc manner
Procedures are tracked and follow a regular pattern
Procedures documented and communicated
Procedures monitored and measured
Best Practice procedures followed and automated

The CMM operation framework (Figure 2) maps specific activities into definable levels of capability. The levels
are defined to allow both assessment of the current level of capability and to identify how improvement to a
higher level cane attained. Using this model, specific activities can be deconstructed into manageable segments
to make them understandable and implemented by the end-user.

Figure 2. An apapted Capability Maturity Model (CMM) operational framework for mapping security activities
to capability (Williams, 2008).

The results below show how a mapping of IDS key processes can be translated into this oprtational framework.

RESULTS
Using the key processes for IDS identified by the standards (as discussed above), a mapping was created to
elucidate on the activities involved and the capability level these can be attributed to (Table 2). Each key process
listed above was deconstructed into its constituent activities and defined at increasing levels of effectiveness.
These constituent activities are placed in the table against one of the five defined levels of capability where
assessment of complexity of the activity is matched to the capability levels 1-5 (Table 1).
The construction of the table and allocation of each activity at each level is an informed but somewhat arbitrary
process. However it does enable clear identification of each task for each process. Key processes at level 1 are
either non-existent or of limited implementation. Similarly, those at level 5 are well developed, mostly
automated and reflect best practice. For instance, the key process of ‘configuration checking’ is not undertaken
at level 1 and is automated using scanning tools at level 5. The mapping in Table 2 also indicates the support
required and the tools available for deploying an IDS. It should be noted that whilst ‘policy’ is not listed as a
key process, “security policies and procedures go hand-in-hand with technological countermeasure such as
firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDSs), towards leveraging the organization’s security posture,
mitigating risk, and maintaining financial and competitive viability” (Rosenthal, 2002).

Table 2: IDS key process mapping to CMM operational framework capability levels.
Intrusion detection
system key
processes
IDS Policy
Policy
communication
Activity monitoring
and automation
Configuration
check
File authorization
check

Level 1(Initial)
Does not exist
Not communicated
Monitoring does not
take place
No configuration check
takes place

Level 2(repeatable)
Verbal

Written

verbally
communicated
Manual monitoring of
some system
activities
Manual checking of
some system
vulnerabilities monthly

Written and provided to
some staff

No manual checking of
files done

Manually file checking
takes place for user
authorization

Log file
examination

Log file examination not
done

Manually basic
security log files are
examined

Packet sniffer
check

Sniffing tools are not
monitored

Manually analyse
packets

Password files
check

Password file not
checked

Passwords files
checked for
unauthorized
accounts only
Manually uninstalling
all the unwanted
services installed.
Integrity of file
checked monthly

Services check

No unwanted services
are checked.

File integrity
assessment

Integrity of file not
checked

Response

Response detected
without any measures.

Response send to
management console
only

Backup storage

Storage is done near
the system

Near the locker onsite

Backup data
security access

Only employees

Specified employees

Training

TOOLS

Support
Software

Level 3(defined)

Manual monitoring of all
the system activities
Periodic automated check
of some system and
network vulnerabilities
File authorization takes
place automatically to
check tampering of user
data periodically
Automatically log files are
examined for router
periodically
Monitoring the system and
its configuration for packet
sniffer.
Automated checking of
accounts deletion of user
accounts not required.
Automated checking of
some unwanted services
done periodically
Integrity of file checked
weekly
Response is send to
management console and
administrator
Backup data taken home
by staff and returned
Specified administrator
assigned.

Training not provided

Intrusion detection
procedures are
included

Intrusion detection and
training provided for
newcomers

Support is not available

Ad hoc is supported

Support is available

Level 4(managed)

Level 5(optimized)

Written for packet sniffer,
monitoring and response.
Policy in written form; training
provided for some staff
Automated monitoring for
user, system and policy
violations

Policy is written for monitoring, packet sniffer, response
and backup storage.
Policy is communicated to all employees and training
provided

Periodic automated check of
all systems and networks

Automated configuration checking of each system and
networks daily using port scanning tools

File authorization takes place
automatically to check
tampering of user and group
authorization periodically
Automatically log files are
examined for router and
server periodically
Automated system and
network done for monitoring
sniffing tools
Automated deletion of all
unauthorized accounts and
other files with change of
passwords periodically

Automatic file authorization check for tampering for user
and group authorization daily and maintain file access
settings for comparing with the current settings to detect
any modification.

Automated checking of all
services weekly.
Integrity of file checked daily
Response is send to senior
administrator giving a
graphical user interface of
events detected.
Backup data is taken offsite
and stored
Senior staff and administrator
Understanding all the basic
Intrusions detection methods,
initial training and disaster
recovery plan,
Support is contracted and
available

Automated monitoring of abnormal attack patterns on the
system and all user activities and policies.

All the log files for router, server, process and other
security logs are examined automatically per day
Automated system and network checking is done for
identifying unauthorized sniffing tool, packet analysis is
done for detecting malicious activities.
Automated deletion of all unauthorized accounts and files
that are compromised from the systems password file on a
regular basis. The system passwords are changed
regularly.
Automated checking of all the unwanted services installed
in the operating system. The service files are analyzed for
intrusion and unnecessary files are removed by users.
Integrity of file checked daily and countermeasures taken
for it.
Response is send to specified senior administrator by
email, pager etc, management console and preventive
measures taken.
Backup data is taken offsite and multiple copies are made
Senior administrator and manager.
Full training provided on various sections of intrusion
detection, disaster recovery plan implemented, proper
induction for all the newcomers.
In house contract and support available
Airdefense or similar used

DISCUSSION
Table 2 demonstrates how intrusion detection implementation can be clarified into manageable steps using the
capability operational framework and matched to the end-users’ capabilities. The application of the activity
mapping in Table 2 can be used for two activities. Firstly to assess the current level of security capability in the
use of IDS and secondly to identify potential improvements in security practice. The table could be enhanced
when applied to a specific end-user profession by identifying the legal and ethical requirements of that
profession in relation to IDS implementation. In this case, correlation of professional and legal requirements
with the defined levels of capability would be undertaken. Using the mapping, the current level of capability of
the end-user can be assessed and improvement is based upon this starting point.
Table 2 provides information to the user about the CMM operational maturity levels which can be achieved and
how to achieve them. The levels are defined as increasing in complexity and effectiveness in terms of IDS
implementation and maintenance. For instance, the initial level to the optimized level gives a new user who is
not skilled in intrusion detection system to develop and maintain it. The process of intrusion detection system
can improve depending upon each level. The initial level shows that all the processes are in ad hoc manner and
the optimized level indicates the best practice. Best practice (level 5) is the ultimate target for every
implementation of IDS. Most of the processes can be done manually or automated. Automated processes work
quicker and are more efficient than manually performing tasks.
The limitations of the framework mapping need to be considered as do the limitations of the IDS technology
itself. IDS is only part of the security management solution and thus taking this framework mapping in isolation
to other security will not result in effective security. However, the mapping of an activity using the CMM
operational framework provides a straightforward representation of the essential processes for IDS
implementation and maintenance. Further, it creates a structure for improvement based on small defines steps
where improvement in security can be incremental. This is important in the application of security measures
which are complex and difficult for the end-user to put into practice.

CONCLUSION
Intrusion detection systems have been widely accepted as an essential security measure as part of a total security
solution. They are an important component because IDS helps identify threats to a network by comparison to
known signatures. Further, it is important that all component processes of effective IDS use are implemented
correctly. The automated monitoring which IDS provides can greatly assist organisations in their security efforts
by logging events, gathering information about network activity, detecting potential unauthorised intrusions and
attacks, preventing actions using blocking and alerting the systems administrator of potential adverse intrusion
events.
The IDS capability mapping (Table 2) presented is being used in current research to assess the capability of endusers in security implementation in the primary care medical field. Whilst the IDS security activity defined in
this paper provides guidance for improvement in security practices, expansion of the mapping table would be
required to identify potential accreditation to national and international standards for IDS security. Further, for
application in specific professional area, correlation of professional endorsement standards related to IDS should
be added to the CMM operation framework table of activities. This would provide an uncomplicated method for
assessment of current IDS capability for the end-user and provide evidence of best practice for accreditation
purposes.
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